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2Application Fingerprinting
• Active or passive
• Prior work: Determining the type of 
application
 File transfers, peer-to-peer, chat, etc. 
[Sen et al.'04; Karagiannis et al.'05; Hernandez-Campos 
et al.'05; Bernaille et al.'06]
 Packet traces
 Flow records
• Our work: Determining specific 
implementations of an application
3Network Traffic Logging
• Monitoring network usage, traffic 
analysis, network intrusion detection...
• Flow records: Traffic summaries
 Require less resources than recording 
packets
 Uni- or Bi-directional
 IP address, port numbers, protocol, 
timestamp, byte/packet counts
4Browser Fingerprinting
• Our approach does not rely on payload
• Uses behavioral features evidenced in 
flows
• Implications: Improvements to …
 Network intrusion detection systems
 Platform-dependent malware
 Traffic deanonymization
 Identifying web sites in anonymized traffic
5Challenges
• Browser traffic dependent on website 
content
 Differences due to geographical locations
 Differences over time
• Variations in user behavior …
●   Client browser configuration
●   Client hardware configuration
• How can we address these challenges?
6PlanetLab Datasets
• Collected from 21 hosts across eight 
locations
 Retrieve front page of top 150 websites 
over one month
 Browser cache set to 400MB
• PlanetLab-Native Dataset
 Firefox, Opera
• PlanetLab-QEMU Dataset
 IE, Firefox, Opera, Safari
7CMU Dataset
• Traffic from edge routers of Carnegie 
Mellon University campus network
• Six weeks from Oct-Dec 2007
• Argus flow records
 Include first 64 bytes of flow payload
• Opera and Firefox
• Website retrievals identified by “GET / “, 
and include flows in the following 10 sec
8Feature Selection
 Mean, std.dev., max, min, median, first and 
third quartile, inter-quartile range, sum
• Feature selection using information gain
• Each retrieval represented by feature vector 
9Browser Classifier
• Support Vector Machine (SVM)
• Finds a hyperplane that maximally 
separates the data
• “Confidence”:
 Minimum distance of the testing instance 
to the hyperplane
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Browser Classifier
• Train and test classifier on different datasets
• For each host h, returns the browser most 
classified in h's retrievals
 browserguess(h) =      
 Classifier makes no classification for host h
 browser(h) =
 Actual browser could not be determined 
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Tests on PlanetLab-QEMU 
• Clean data in controlled environment
• Separate traffic by browser and location
• Training data
 Traffic from top 100 websites 
 Traffic from all PlanetLab locations
• Testing data
 Traffic from top 100-150 websites
 Traffic from each PlanetLab location
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Tests on PlanetLab-QEMU 
13
Tests on PlanetLab-QEMU 
Pretty good, right? 
How about on real 
user traffic?
14
Tests on CMU Dataset
• Training data: PlanetLab-Native dataset
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Browser Fingerprinting Works! 
• Coarse traffic summaries
• Training and testing data from different 
geographical locations, different 
websites, different time frames
• Tests on real user data has 75% 
precision and 60% recall
 Precision of random guessing is 25%
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Applications to Network Intrusion 
Detection Systems
• Traffic Aggregation for Malware Detection 
(TAMD) [Yen and Reiter, DIMVA’08]
• Stealthy malware: spyware, adware, bots, …
 Subtle command/control system
 Organized malicious activities
• Spamming, hosting phishing sites, DDoS 
attacks
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Traffic Aggregation for Malware Detection
• Observe traffic at network border
 Multiple infected hosts in the network
 Malware communication patterns different 
from benign hosts
• Find traffic from multiple hosts that share 
similar characteristics
 Common destination
 Similar payload
 Similar platform
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Similar Platform
• Operating system specific features
 Time-to-live (TTL) field, communications to 
characteristic sites (e.g., Microsoft time 
server)
• May fail to identify application-dependent 
malware 
• Incorporate browser fingerprinting
 Traffic sharing same OS or same browser
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Evaluation
• Target platform-dependent infections that 
contact common destinations
• Output groups of traffic sharing multiple 
characteristics
• Data reduction tool Common Destination
Similar Payload
Similar Platform
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Evaluation
• Malware traffic:
 Bagle, IRCBot, MyBot, SDBot, SpyBot, HTTP-
based bot, large IRC botnet
• For every hour of traffic in CMU dataset
 Assign malware traffic to originate from 
randomly selected internal hosts 
 Input to TAMD
 Repeat for every hour, for each malware
• Malware are OS-dependent
 Quantify cost of incorporating browser 
fingerprinting 
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Evaluation
• The hosts we assigned malware traffic to is 
always identified
• On average, 
2.25 groups per 
hour
22
Evaluation
• 0.02 groups per hour due to browser similarity
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Applications to 
Traffic Deanonymization
• Infers the web sites contacted in 
anonymized traffic
• Classifying browser first can improve 
precision of traffic deanonymization ...
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Website Classifier
• Bayesian belief networks
 Given a test instance, generates a 
probability for each class
 Outputs class with highest probability
• Establishing “confidence”...
 Only selects from probabilities above the 
“cutoff”
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Website Classification Features
• Per distinct server, for first five servers
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Selecting Stable Websites
• Focus on stable websites
 Determined by average number of flows 
and std. dev of byte/packet counts
 Simple or high-variability websites do not 
include enough information for classifier to 
make confidence guesses 
• 52 websites selected from top 100
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Per-browser vs. Generic Classifier
• Per-browser website classifier
 Trained on traffic from a single browser
• Generic website classifier
 Trained on traffic from all four browsers
• Apply same testing data to compare 
results
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Tests on PlanetLab-QEMU 
• Training data: Website retrievals from all 
PlanetLab locations
 Per-browser website classifier for each 
browser
 Generic website classifier
• Testing data: Website retrievals from each 
PlanetLab location
• Which per-browser website classifier?
 Determined by browser fingerprinting
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Tests on PlanetLab-QEMU
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Tests on CMU Dataset
• Training data: PlanetLab-Native dataset
• Testing data: CMU dataset
 Ground truth from HTTP “Host” field 
• Which per-browser website classifier?
 Determined by browser fingerprinting
 Actual browser implementation
• Show improvements when more accurate 
browser fingerprinting can be developed
31
Tests on CMU Dataset
32
Implications for Traffic 
Deanonymization
• When focusing on specific websites of 
interest to the attacker...
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Conclusion
• Browser fingerprinting on flow records 
reached 75% precision and 60% recall
• Enables network intrusion detection 
system to detect more malware
• Improves precision of traffic 
deanonymization
